Abstract
due to misrepresentation, lack of uniqueness of presentation, and inadvertent or malicious hiding of content.
It is also worth to recall that security of transactions must be assessed in context and can in general not be reduced to information security. The communication medium voice contributes to non-repudiation by offering an independent means of speaker identification. The voice archiving system presented below is, with respect to non-repudiation, the analogue of an archive of digital documents which are not signed but only time-stamped at entry. Such a kind of document repository is most commonly used for electronic mail rooms in the domain of E-government [6] and records management [7] . But due to the intrinsic properties of voice, the probative value of securely archived conversations can reasonably be assumed to be much higher than in this analogy.
The state-of-the art of digital voice recording as used widely for instance in financial institutions, is marked by solutions that directly capture VoIP streams and use security only at the transport layer (SSL) [8, 9] . The neglect of security of the stored conversations is perhaps an outcome of the mentioned advantageous features of voice. Nevertheless, we argue that the probative force of digitally stored voice requires in particular the proper consideration of the integrity of the voice communication during and after storage, like for any other digital data.
Related work on securing the integrity of streamed data by signatures is scarce. The authors of [10] describe a method for stream signatures for broadcast media. In [11, 12] a method to transport authentication information employing watermarks and steganography is presented. Digital signatures are not explicitly used and achievable data rates seem low.
This motivates our present approach to devise a secure archive for VoIP-based communication. Section 2 explains the specific security requirements for such an archive. Section 3 describes its design and implementation proper, from base concept and architecture to implementation. Section 4 examines the most important possible attacks and how they can be dealt with, thus providing a security analysis of the archive concept. Section 5 contains conclusions and an outlook to future work.
Requirements for a secure VoIP archive
The secure archiving voice based communication must take four main areas of requirements into account, namely security, efficiency, scalability, and long-term aspects.
In the area of security the main goal is to establish the limited non-repudiation of the archived communication described in the introduction. This comprises cohesion Each archived conversation has to provide a proof of cohesion. That is, the ordering, temporal sequencing, and completeness of the stored communication packets must be verifiable to enable a reconstruction of the conversation.
integrity has to be assured to maintain that a communication was not changed at any point during or after archiving.
creation time Each conversation has to be reliably associated with a certain time, which must be as close as possible to the conversation's start and the initiation of the archiving.
While a secure assignment of a creation time is a general requirement for most digital archives, it serves, for a VoIP archive, also as a base to establish cohesion by providing a temporal context. Integrity of voice communication refers not only to raw data, but also to cohesion. Therefore, to achieve the desired combination of cohesion and integrity, it is insufficient to simply store raw VoIP streams in the archive, since those are amenable to forgery by cutting. Thus it is highly desirable, both from a security as well as an efficiency viewpoint, to secure and archive a VoIP conversation as "close" as possible to its transmission, and conceptually close to the actual VoIP stream. To provide a solution for a secure VoIP archive in this extended sense is our main contribution.
The second area regards vital efficiency aspects of a real world implementation. Simplicity of the implementation should minimise the effect on existing systems and infrastructures, e.g., client-side requirements for the archiving process should be completely avoided. A tight integration is required to enable the utilisation of existing infrastructures without or with only minor changes. An efficient use of memory and computational resources can be achieved by basic conceptual design decisions. One major requirement in this context is that the data are streamed direct to the archive without necessitating a buffering of a whole conversation (e.g. to sign it after termination). This entails that all security-related operation are performed on the data stream on-the-fly and optimally concentrated in a single module with minimum storage of its own. Alternatives, like converting a recorded conversation, e.g.,to a Blob in the same or another audio format and signing it after the call is completed is conceptually not different from electronically signing an arbitrary digital document. Such an approach will a) possibly (depending on the target format) loose the contextual information about temporal order and direction of the communication, and b) introduce another component (for audio conversion) potentially subject to forgery attacks. Apart from that, it would be inefficient since most VoIP codecs already provide good compression and thus conversion to, e.g., MP3, will be costly in terms of memory and computational power.
The last area is the scalability of the concept. Considering the amount of voice communications in a company or call-centre, it is obvious that archiving solutions have to cope with a broad spectrum of workloads to be handled. The concept should therefore for instance enable the usage of external archiving infrastructures. Scalability is another reason to prefer a streaming security solution over an intermediate storage and securing conversations afterwards. In particular the memory requirements in the latter case pose, e.g., a hard upper threshold for the number of concurrent calls, respectively duration of stored conversations in the temporary memory.
Some long-term aspects of information security have to be considered as well with respect to the archiving and verification processes. For instance, the concept has to assure that it is possible at later times to apply certain transformations on the data as they can be required if, e.g., certificates are withdrawn, the security of cryptographic algorithms is no longer assured, or it is needed to transform the voice data into a different data format to ensure readability [13, 14] . These problems, though outside of the scope of our concept proper, should be mitigated by a modular design and use of openly documented technology.
System design and implementation
In this section, we describe a high-level architecture for a voice archive scenario, the basic concepts underlying our approach, and a concrete implementation of its central component which ensures security of the archive.
Architecture design
The main design principle in the implementation and deployment variant we describe here is that of minimal technical requirements at the part of the communication clients. The presented architecture is also used as a system model for potential attacks in the next section. Figure 1 shows the communication between two partners and over a VoIP channel, which is an idealisation, comprising in particular session initiation and communication. At a certain Ö is the component to which also the mentioned longterm aspects are deferred. Research has yielded some sound solutions for the efficient, secure, long-term archiving of signed digital documents, mostly based on the use of hashtrees [15] . Some systems are already on the market which can be flexibly combined with [16, 17] or are already integrated into document management systems [18] . Application of such systems in the role of the voice archivist Ö suggests itself.
ÎË will often be under the control of one of the parties or even be integrated in their VoIP infrastructure. Neither the exact position in the channel nor the technical method by which ÎË intercepts it is essential for the architecture and its security properties discussed below in Section 4. The role of ÎË can be passive or dual, listening to communication and enforcing policies on it. We will present a single example of policy enforcement by ÎË in Section 3.2. The separation of such a component from the rest of the system is standard in security engineering where it is commonly known as a reference monitor [19] .
In accordance with the mentioned principle of minimal client involvement the communication between and is in particular not required to be digital, let alone SIP/RTP based, end-to-end, provided that there is some part of the channel which is VoIP. This condition is already met in many mobile and public switched networks. In particular, the phones used by and need not be ISDN or VoIP phones.
Furthermore, the application domain of the presented voice archive concept and architecture is not restricted to intra-and inter-organisational telephony. In principle it comprises archiving of any packet-based digital voice conversation, e.g., in (tele-) conferences, or digital radio communication as used by government authorities and organisations entrusted with security tasks, see [20] .
Base concept
A digital multimedia communication consists in general in two channels transporting data packets and meta data back and forth between two partners. The proposed concept handles these data by creating so-called intervals, containing several packets. The integrity of each interval is secured by hashes and the application of a cryptographic secret to protect the hash value. At the start of an archiving process ÎË cryptographically secures sufficient data to provide a unique identity the subsequent stream, to ensure the archive's integrity.
To ensure cohesion two measures are taken. First a cryptographic chain is formed by including the hash value of one interval in the data used to compute its successor. An attacker cannot remove a single interval without invalidating the subsequent hashes and thus being detected. Due to the cryptographic secret applied to each interval any manipulation of a interval's content as well as addition or deletion of intervals is excluded.
At the end of the chain a special terminating package is added signalling its end. If this package is missing it is clear that the archived version was tampered with in transmission between ÎË and Ö or was incompletely archived due to a malfunction in Ö.
During archiving of a conversation, ÎË monitors the quality of service (QoS) of the voice connection. If a certain QoS threshold in terms of, e.g., packet loss, is underrun then either the connection quality is poor and the participants cannot understand each other with a sufficient quality, or there is an ongoing attempt to attack the communication. Both cases lead to a lack of trustworthiness of the archived conversation. It is now a matter of policy how to deal with this QoS under-run. It could be ignored, the users could be notified while continuing the archiving, the archiving could be aborted, or the call could be terminated. The first two options open the path for certain semantic attacks as will be discussed in Section 4. We favour termination of the call as this the option for maximum security and the QoS threshold is seldom reached without a breakdown of the connection anyway due to insufficient understandability or software timeouts. It should be noted that this is not an essential design decision and that the policy actually em-ployed depends on security requirements of the application scenario. QoS as such and in particular packet loss is, however, an essential point that a secure VoIP archive has to cope with.
The QoS observed by ÎË is not identical to the ones perceived by either or , but rather only an upper bound for them. The sharpness of the bound depends on the "distance" of ÎË to or in the channel. In applications it can therefore be a good choice to integrate ÎË with the VoIP system of one of the parties, perhaps the one interested in the archiving in the first place.
The length of a interval and the QoS threshold are the main free parameters in the concept. While the latter depends on application-dependent (security) requirements, see [3] , the former should be optimised so as to minimise cryptographic workload and storage overhead. This must be balanced with the loss of conversation context in the case of a QoS under-run, when the last interval has to be discarded. Dynamic adaption of interval length is also the lever to satisfy the scalability requirement described in Section 2.
Implementation and protocol integration 3.3.1 Overview
The archive system has been implemented as a prototype and tested with several soft phones and hardware-devices (e.g., AVM's Fritz!Box [21] ) using the SIP and RTP protocols. For nomenclature of these protocols used below see [22, 23, 24] . In the place of we used mobile phones, ISDN phones, and also SIP software clients. ÎË was implemented using C#, running on an embedded x86 based PC without keyboard, mouse or video ports. The Linux operating system with the Mono-framework was used to run the program. It was placed as a proxy between and the Internet using its two NICs, and thus supports multiple clients and calls at the same time. ÎË is implemented as an outbound proxy substituting A's original outbound proxy. The proxy modifies RTP ports and IP addresses contained in the SIP packets redirecting them to itself and in turn forwards them to the original recipients. A traditional PC was used for Ö, connected using the third NIC of ÎË . They communicate over a reliable TCP channel (for privacy also the TLS protocol could be used).
RTP-packets are grouped in intervals where each interval is signed and stored on Ö. Each interval consists of about one second worth of RTP packets. Because the implementation only supports bidirectional calls (conference calls have not yet been implemented at the time of writing), there were two intervals per second, one for each channel/RTP stream. The duration of an interval is one of the main configuration parameters to be tuned. One second proved to be sufficient to provide a high level of security for the context of the talk on the one hand. On the other hand it keeps the computational power required by far low enough for the used x86 processor and also the storage overhead (400 bytes for PKCS#7 signatures without embedded certificates) to payload ratio small.
ÎË carries a X.509 certificate together with the private (RSA) key to sign (using asymmetric cryptography) all intervals, including the special start and stop interval containing meta data. The certificate that ÎË carries is not only used to sign the contents of the call for the final archiving and later verification, but also to authenticate ÎË to Ö. CHK3 Verifying interval chaining. Ö stores the SHA1 hash of the last interval and compares it to the embedded hash value in the current one. If they do not match the chain was broken and communication is terminated.
CHK4 Checking packet loss by checking the absolute sequence numbers in the interval structure. If the packet loss is above the QoS threshold, the archiving is aborted by Ö and the call terminated by ÎË , by injecting a BYE command terminating SIP and RTP forwarding. We chose 1% packet loss as threshold, which still ensures good understandability.
CHK5 Checking the time embedded by ÎË in the intervals whether it drifted not more than two times the interval duration from the internal clock of Ö. In the demonstrator, clocks were synchronised with NTP, which should be replaced with a secure, trustworthy time source in a production system.
CHK6
Checking the temporal integrity of the RTP packets, i.e., whether the time-stamps and sequence numbers stored in the RTP protocol, which can suffer from In this way the whole conversation is continuously and securely streamed from ÎË to Ö and ÎË never needs to store more than 2s worth of RTP packets per call in memory (in particular a hard disk is in principle not required on ÎË ). ÎË also has to do only about two RSA signing operation per second.
Data format
The format used to stream the call from ÎË to Ö consists of intervals, including a special initial interval carrying meta data, a final interval containing the reason of the termination of the call, and several intervals with voice data (initial and final interval do not carry any voice data). Each of the intervals stems from either RTP channel from to or the other direction. Each interval is embedded in an PKCS#7 signed envelope container. Only the first interval's PKCS#7 signed envelope container contains the whole certificate chain up to, but not including the root, while all other containers don't need to carry this redundant information. The first interval is also additionally wrapped in a signature from the time stamp service Ì½. Ö simply stores each interval (together with its signature), e.g., to its hard drive after performing the described checks on it. The signed and timestamped content of the initial interval consist of • A random nonce. This mitigates a replay and duplication attack, see Section 4.
• The date and time of the call.
• The from and to SIP URLs of the caller and callee.
• The mapping of RTP payloads to the used media formats and codecs. This information is embedded in the SDP bodies of, e.g., the INVITE request from the SIP signalling. Without this information the dynamic RTP payload in the rage from 96-127 would not be known later when the archived call is played back. As an implementation variant it is also possible that the implementation modifies the SDP negotiation to only allow certain codecs which have a high probability to have existing implementations available later (e.g., no proprietary codecs).
The signed content of the last interval consists of
• Hash of the second-to-last interval to complete the cryptographic chain.
• A flag that this is the last interval of an archived call.
• Reason for termination: Protocol or network error, regular hang up by or , violation of packet loss QoS threshold under-run, or tamper detection.
All other intervals contain actual speech data, as follows.
• Hash of the complete, signed (and time-stamped in the case of interval no. 2) interval before this interval.
• Date and time of this interval.
• Direction/channel of this interval. In the implementation for duplex calls between only two parties this can be from to or the other direction.
• List of absolute sequence numbers of the contained RTP packets.
• The complete RTP packets referenced by this list, including their payload type and the truncated timestamps and sequence-numbers.
All intervals together form a cryptographic chain from the first to the last interval. Intervals of both directions (channels of the duplex phone call) are interleaved. After two intervals of one direction there must be a interval with the other direction and the date and time in the intervals must be sequential. Otherwise Ö or any other verifier of an archived conversation has to reject the file, just as if a hash value or signature was invalid.
Replay window
ÎË contains a component to sort incoming packets and has a replay protection which removes replayed packets. This is implemented using a 32 Bit sliding window. Because RTP-packets only contain a 16 Bit-sequence number (which is even recommended to not start with 0 or 1, but with a random value to improve symmetric encryption) and only a 32 Bit time stamp (which also starts at a random value, can overflow, and is not related to an absolute time) this component also helps in creating absolute sequencenumbers starting at 0 and checking the system time against the time stamp of the packet for consistency. If any of these checks is violated, the call is terminated. If ÎË does not detect these things (because it has been tampered with), then Ö will stop archiving because it employs the same tests.
Security considerations
We discuss some general issues before we come to particular attacks. First, the security of the digital voice archive cannot be better than that of an analog archive. Forgery of voice communication is generally considered difficult, however a cunning attacker with sufficient resources might eventually be able to simulate any VoIP stream he desires, and insert it to the archive, e.g., from the position (2a) in Figure 1 . Such attacks are out of the scope of the present concept, and will remain so without involvement of the clients and in particular their authentication and provable trustworthiness. Nevertheless, the base principles and architectural design of the voice archive can prevent the insertion of forged communications through other channels, respectively, from other positionings in the system model, as will be shown below.
Finally, an inherent feature of the base concept described in Section 3.2 is its fragility. Artificially lowering the quality of the connection, e.g., by causing or simulating (e.g., by B) packet loss, is clearly an attack vector and poses a risk to the trustworthiness of a voice archive. When the voice quality in a interval falls below a given threshold, the cryptographic chaining ends, providing a Sollbruchstelle (predetermined break point) for the probative value of the archived communication, since only the parts before that break are cryptographically verifiable. In contrast, most other schemes for securing the integrity of streamed data, e.g., the signing method of [10] aim at loss-tolerance, for instance allowing for the verification of the stream signature with some probability, even in the presence of intermittent packet loss. We argue that for the probative value of inter-personal, natural language communication, the former behaviour is advantageous. An archived call with an intermediate one-second gap can always give rise to speculations over alternatives of filling the gap, which are restricted by syntax and grammar, but can lead to different semantics. Using this, a clever and manipulative attacker could delete parts of the communication before they enter the archive, claiming with some credibility that the remnants have another meaning than intended by the communication partner(s). But if the contents of a conversation after such an intentional deletion are unverifiable and thus cannot be used to prove anything, this kind of attack is effectively impeded.
We now perform an attack analysis by the location of a potential attacker within the system described in the previous section. The protection targets under attack are mentioned for each single one. The numbering of the attacks corresponds to the positions marked in Figure 1 . The analysis rests on the abstract concept of Section 3.2 to exhibit its salient security-related features. The technical variants chosen in Section 3.3 are mentioned in the end of this section.
(1) Man-in-the-middle (between ÎË and Ö). The main threat against our method to securely archive voice data emanates from an attacker who can intercept and manipulate the data in transmission from ÎË to Ö. This attack vector makes the strong assumption that any transport layer security between ÎË and Ö has been broken. There are two ways to insert a forged conversation into Ö; either he interrupts an ongoing submission to Ö by suppressing ÎË after, say, interval n and continues it himself with interval n + 1; or, he starts a submission to Ö himself, pretending to be ÎË . These options, threatening the cohesion of conversations, respectively, the integrity of the archive, are ruled out by the base concept underlying ÎË , depending on two particular countermeasures.
C1.1 Build a chain of cryptographically secured hash values using a secret known only to ÎË (or shared between ÎË and Ö). This prevents (1) from executing the first attack variant since he cannot continue the chain of intervals. For detectability of (1) by Ö during a submission, the use of the correct secret should be verifiable by Ö. Various symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic methods provide for the desired features.
C1.2 To start the chain of secured intervals and prevent the second attack variant by (1), some initial data must be secured. In the simplest case, this is not different from C1.1 and consists only in securing the first interval of the transmission. We will see below that refinements are desirable to heighten resilience of the overall system. The initialisation can be used in close conjunction with C1.1, e.g., if the Diffie-Hellman protocol [25] is used to establish a shared secret. On the other extreme part of the spectrum, ÎË can use certificate-based authentication toward Ö to initiate the submission.
It should be noted that these two countermeasures are inherent in our original concept. All other countermeasures below depend on them as technical or process implementation variants providing gradually improvements on security.
(2) Replay forgery. Consider an attacker listening to the VoIP channel at some point near or and able to simulate a VoIP conversation toward ÎË . Assume (2) is recording some initial part of a real archived conversation between and . This attacker can then in principle compromise the integrity of Ö by replaying this initial piece to ÎË and continuing it with a different conversation, either forged synthetically, or in collaboration with and . In consequence, non-repudiation of the fact that a particular conversation has taken place is easier, since now Ö contains two data sets with very similar, or even bitwise identical initial sections of a certain length. The threat of this attack to the archive's integrity is even larger in the following, related case (2a) Replay forgery with VoIP source control. Due to the imperfection of VoIP communication, the attack of (2) is generally difficult since he does not know precisely which packets actually arrived at ÎË . The tolerable packet loss of VoIP is therefore likely to entail discrepancies between original and replay even in the first interval of a communication, depending on interval size. Therefore position (2a), where he directly listens to ÎË 's data source is better suited to a replay attack, in particular since the two conversations will even appear to have been carried out at the same time and along the same route since (2) replays the recorded SIP meta-data as well. This meta-data, containing routing information and system times is also difficult to forge in position (2).
C2.1 Exploitation of randomness of VoIP, i.e., packet loss is the simplest countermeasure against (2) . If the interval size is large enough the mentioned discrepancies are likely to occur, in effect discriminating original from replay forgery. To raise this likelihood, ÎË could secure a determined number ≫ 1 of intervals to initiate the chain.
C2.2 Using a random seed to initiate the secured chain is a much stronger countermeasure. Again, various methods can be applied to that end, either within ÎË or using an external source of trust, see C3.2 below.
Note that the question whether a data set that is detected to be an artifact of a replay attack -something which can always be determined only with a certain probabilityshould be (marked and) kept in Ö or discarded is a matter of policies.
(3) Compromised ÎË secret. If an attacker has control over ÎË to the extent that she knows the secret used to initiate and build a chain of intervals she is in the position, like (1) but more effectively, to insert forged conversations into Ö. If we assume that (3), possessing, e.g., ÎË 's authentication data, completely appears as ÎË to Ö, still two categories of countermeasures apply.
C3.1 Internally, ÎË can use rotation of the secrets, e.g., one-time keys generated for every conversation from a master secret, which in turn requires a significantly better protection. The hardware security provided by trusted platforms suggests itself for this purpose.
C3.2 An external source of trust can be invoked at every submission to initiate the chain of intervals. For instance, a time-stamping service Ì½ can be used to sign the data initiating the chain. This relies of course on the assumption that the authentication of ÎË with respect to Ì½ remains unbroken and thus (3) cannot obtain time stamps on her own.
C3.2 additionally raises resilience against replay attacks. Regarding (3), her only remaining attack if the latter countermeasure is in effect is a replay attack as well, which will easily be detected due to identical time stamps over, and random seeds in, the initial data. C4.1 The separation of duties between ÎË and Ö makes it difficult for Ö to forge secured conversations and to claim that they originate from ÎË . This holds always in the asymmetric situation that Ö does not know the secret ÎË uses to secure chains of intervals, but is able to verify them, which remains a prerequisite of the secure archiving. Even if (4) has the additional power of (3) the further separation of duties by C3.2 and the invocation of the time stamping service Ì½ effectively suppresses his ability to forge conversations that "look like" those coming from ÎË .
C4.2 One basic security problem of long-term archiving remains, namely the authority of Ö over the archived data. This enables Ö at least in principle, given enough time and computational power, to manipulate the archived data. A method that is considered to be generally effective for mitigating this threat is the use of periodic time-stamps from another time-stamping authority Ì¾ over the bulk of data archived during a period. Hash-trees are the method of choice to implement this process effectively.
Special attacks can be attempted in a combination of the positionings above. For instance, an attacker combining roles (1) and (2a) could try to insert a back-dated call into Ö. From (2a), he would insert calls at times of his choosing into ÎË , intercept and store the generated initial intervals containing time-stamps from Ì½ at (1) and suppress transmission of the conversation to Ö. Later he would try to insert the call he wishes to back-date from (2a) into ÎË , but replacing, from (1), only the initial interval by a stored one time-stamped at the desired earlier time. This fails due to the chaining of intervals and the uniqueness of initial intervals induced by the use of a nonce, i.e., this attack is suppressed by C2.2, in conjunction with C1.1 and C1.2.
In the technical variant described in Section 3.3, C1.2 is implemented by using digital signatures based on asymmetric cryptography on all intervals and enveloping the first interval in a cryptographic time-stamp. Countermeasures C2.2, and C3.2 are taken into account by including a random nonce in the first interval, and use of the initial timestamp from the external TSA T1, respectively.
Conclusions
We have presented a system for archiving VoIP-based communication which has some salient security features in contrast to existing digital voice recording solutions. The present solution is stand-alone and offers a high degree of scalability, ease of integration, and efficiency without tradeoffs with respect to security.
Certain advanced implementation variants can be envisaged based on our concept. In particular, utilisation of trusted platforms (TP) as specified by the trusted computing group [26] suggest themselves. A TP can be used for various security-related tasks in ÎË , e.g., storing secrets, securing data channels and interfaces, or providing a trustworthy computing environment. As another instance of trusted computing usage, the time-stamping by ÎË could be implemented using an internal trusted clock of ÎË seeded daily by Ì½, in order to reduce the cost of purchasing timestamps.
A real-world implementation also needs to consider conditions for, and signalling and negotiation of recording of a conversation. The draft standard [27] describes a method by which "One party may assert either their desire to record or their restriction of the other party's recording". Using these assertions in our archiving architecture in the sense that ÎË evaluates and respects them would be a nice way to disarm privacy reservations to indiscriminate recording of calls. On the other hand, signalling of archiving status and (reasons for) termination of the archiving, respectively, the call are desirable future features. A device independent way using speech synthesis can be envisaged.
As an outlook, it seems possible to extend the present concept to a full-fledged electronic signature over VoIPbased conversations. This includes, either unilateral or mutual, authentication of communication partners, nonrepudiation of a conversation's content, and ultimately leads to a probative force of such conversations equivalent to other electronically signed documents. This enables declarations of will and establishment of binding contracts by voice. Of course such an advanced scenario is no longer possible without a certain involvement of the clients, in particular their trustworthiness and integration into an authentication infrastructure like a PKI. Working out this advanced scenario is in progress [28] .
